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Introduction 
 When US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was asked about soft power in 
2003, he replied “I don’t know what it means.”1 In February 2006, in a speech at the 
Council on Foreign Relations in New York, however, Rumsfeld was forced to 
concede: 
Our enemies have skillfully adapted to fighting wars in today’s media 
age, but for the most part we, our country, our government, has not 
adapted. Consider that the violent extremists have established media 
relations committees—these are terrorists and they have media relations 
committees that meet and talk about strategy, not with bullets but with 
words. They’ve proven to be highly successful at manipulating the 
opinion elites of the world. They plan and design their headline-grabbing 
attacks using every means of communication to intimidate and break the 
collective will of free people…They know that communications 
transcend borders and that a single news story handled skillfully can be 
as damaging to our cause and helpful to theirs as any other method of 
military attack. And they’re doing it. They’re able to act quickly. They 
have relatively few people. They have modest resources compared to the 
vast and expensive bureaucracies of Western governments. Our federal 
government is really only beginning to adapt our operations to the 21st 
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century. For the most part, the U.S. government still functions as a five 
and dime store in an eBay world.2  
 This chapter explores the use of new media technologies, satellite television 
and the Internet, by two groups, Hizbollah3 and al Qaeda (and affiliated groups and 
individuals) respectively. The argument put forward here is twofold: firstly, while 
both groups are savvy users of new media technologies, which they employ in 
conjunction with their hard power resources to amplify their soft power, the style and 
substance of their new media strategies, and thence their larger goals, differ quite 
dramatically; second, however is the assertion that, despite these differences, both of 
these groups are potentially substantial contributors to the making of a ‘new’ Middle 
East, albeit one very different from that envisaged by the US administration when 
they employ this terminology.  
 
Old Media, New Media: The Evolution of the Terrorism-Media Relationship  
 Nobel’s invention of dynamite in 1867 was the technological breakthrough 
that ushered in the era of modern terrorism. The economy of means afforded by the 
use of dynamite ensured that terrorist bombings proliferated. High levels of illiteracy 
in nineteenth century Europe imposed serious limitations on conventional text-based 
propaganda. Conversely, ‘propaganda by deed’ could show, as the French anarchist 
Paul Brousse explained lucidly at the time, “the weary and inert masses…that which 
they were unable to read, teach them socialism in practice, make it visible, tangible, 
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concrete.”4 When the anarchist Albert Parsons was arraigned for his alleged 
involvement in the Haymarket bombing in Chicago in 1886, he insisted in court that 
dynamite “made all men equal and therefore free.”5 However, while modern terrorists 
may still seek to convey a message through their performance violence, they must 
also employ written and spoken language in an effort to legitimise, rationalise and, 
ultimately, advertise their actions. With the advent of new media technologies, 
however, they are no longer reliant on intermediaries to interpret their deeds; instead 
they may employ the former as soft power tools in order to amplify their hard power 
resources, thus adopting, in Nye’s terms, a ‘smart’ approach to conflict.6 
 Since the advent of the printing press using industrial age technologies in the 19th 
century, terrorists and extremist movements have employed every available mass 
communications technology.  This is evidenced in everything from Carlos 
Marighela’s advice to his comrades to use photocopying machines to produce large 
numbers of pamphlets and manifestos to Hizbollah’s establishment of its al Manar 
television station in the early 1990s. The year that witnessed the birth of modern 
international terrorism, 1968, was the same year in which the United States launched 
the first television satellite, heralding the second great revolution in mass 
communications that directly impacted terrorism.7  
 Much of the explanation of the power of terrorism is said to hinge on how the 
news media operate: “Journalists are attracted to drama and few political spectacles 
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offer greater dramatic appeal than violence.”8 Terrorists are cognisant of this and use 
it to their advantage. In his seminal 1975 paper, Brian Michael Jenkins argued that 
“terrorist attacks are often carefully choreographed to attract the attention of the 
electronic media and the international press.”9 The news media have proved unable to 
ignore events “fashioned specifically for their needs.”10 
 Terrorist ‘spectaculars’ can hijack media attention: witness the attack on the 
Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics, the hijacking of TWA flight 847, the events 
of 9/11 and their aftermath. This is not to suggest, however, that the terrorists 
themselves actually control the news agenda, or can determine the ways in which 
their behaviour is framed. Even where terrorists gain ‘disruptive access’ to the media, 
in their repackaging of events the media still largely rely on official sources and 
dominant understandings of where legitimacy lies.11 In the British case, for example, 
the tabloid press often exceeded the language of the state in stigmatizing the IRA as 
‘scum,’ ‘cowardly murderers,’ and ‘bastards.’12 In the past, those characterized as 
‘terrorists’ were rarely accepted by the mass media as legitimate or authoritative 
sources of news in their own right. Neither were they accepted as reliable 
commentators upon the political situation that had given rise to the violence: 
“Certainly, on the few occasions when the BBC or ITV interviewed Republican 
paramilitaries in the 1970s and 1980s, they were emphatically not, as a matter of 
policy, treated as individuals whose opinions could be accorded the same respect and 
                                                 
8
 Steven Livingston, The Terrorism Spectacle (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 2. 
9
 Brian M. Jenkins, “International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict,” in David Carlton & Carlo 
Schaerf (Eds.), International Terrorism and World Security (London: Croom Helm, 1975), 16. 
10
 J. Bowyer Bell, “Terrorist Scripts and Live-Action Spectaculars,” Columbia Journalism Review, Vol. 
17, No.1, 1978: 50.  
11
 Bethami A. Dobkin, Tales of Terror: Television News and The Construction of the Terrorist Threat 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992); David L. Paletz & Alex P. Schmid, Terrorism and The Media: How 
Researchers, Terrorists, Governments, Press, Public, Victims View and Use the Media (Newbury Park, 
CA: Sage, 1992), 19. 
12
 Carruthers, 191. 
 5 
due consideration as others.”13 By concentrating almost exclusively on the violent 
dimension of terrorism, making no attempt to contextualise its causes, media reports 
often leave readers, viewers, or listeners mystified as to the motivation of violent 
acts.14 The upshot of this is that many in the media audience take these acts to be 
simply the senseless, inexplicable behaviour of psychotic fundamentalists or 
extremist lunatics.15 
 For this reason, terrorists generally accompany their violent acts with a flurry of 
threats, communiqués, and manifestos, leading one commentator to assert “the 
violence of terrorism is positively verbose.”16 Previous to the widespread use of the 
Internet and other new media technologies, the mainstream media were held by many 
to be complicit in the attainment of the terrorists’ objectives. This was because media 
attention to terrorist violence was held to be considerably more significant than the 
terrorists’ own propaganda: “[the terrorists’] own self-generated posters, manifestos, 
leaflets, and broadcasts are unlikely, after all, to reach a wide audience and even less 
likely to convince any other than the already converted.”17 This may have been true 
when cultures and politics could be contained within national borders. Historically, 
leaders and elites were generally the only ones who knew the world first hand. Thus 
they were relied upon to interpret the motives and behaviours of other leaders and 
elites, and to formulate responses. Today, that reliance has all but vanished. The 
Internet and satellite television present those with access and the requisite interest 
with the opportunity to know and interpret the world for themselves, and therefore 
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decreases the historical control by the media and political elites over individual 
worldviews.18 
 “In the modern era, the truism that ‘information is power’ is very clearly 
understood by the media and governments; it is also understood by terrorists, their 
audiences, and their adversaries.”19 If victory, in the information age, is ultimately 
about “whose story wins,”20 the crucial questions become what messages are sent and 
received by whom under which circumstances, and how that affects the ability of 
actors to obtain the outcomes they want.21 Terrorists now have the ability to tell their 
own stories via their websites and television stations. The level of editorial control 
afforded terrorists by their access to new media technologies has added a significant 
new tool to terrorists’ soft power arsenal. This chapter is composed of two case 
studies: the first of these details the use by Hizbollah of their satellite television 
station, al Manar, in their information warfare strategy, while the second case 
describes and analyses the adoption of a heavily Net-centric posture by al Qaeda and 
affiliated groups and individuals. Both of these groups are heavy users of new media 
and their tech-savvy already having made an impact in the Middle East, they are both 
potentially significant contributors to the future remaking of the region in terms of 
both their political violence initiatives and the undoubtedly central role new media 
technologies will play in the groups’ amplification of the latter. Relevant also is the 
way in which efforts by Western governments to muzzle these groups has rebounded 
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on the former and led to widespread derision in the Middle East region (and, indeed, 
farther afield).  
 
New Media Strategy 1: Hizbollah’s Al-Manar TV22 
 The major focus of this section is the way in which Hizbollah has wielded its 
television station, al Manar—the ‘Beacon’ or ‘Lighthouse,’ in Arabic—as a weapon 
in their information war. The argument put forward here is that Hizbollah has met 
with high levels of success in this regard—to the extent that they may recently be seen 
to have become the victims of their own success, with the institution of multiple bans 
on transmission of al Manar globally and the repeated targeting of the station by 
Israeli forces during the summer 2006 crisis. On the other hand, these difficulties may 
also be viewed by the organization as blessings in disguise, as they have forced the 
station to streamline its processes which may, in the long term, not only ensure its 
continued existence, but even allow it to access a larger audience.  
 Although Hizbollah’s political goals are narrower than al Qaeda’s, “[s]ymbolism 
and the projection of messages to internal and external audiences have occupied a 
central place for Hizbollah throughout its evolution.”23 Donald Rumsfeld would 
clearly be surprised to learn that during the crisis precipitated by the hijacking of 
TWA flight 847 in 1985, Hizbollah deftly manipulated the U.S. television networks: 
“There were graduates in media studies from American colleges at meetings at Nabih 
Berri’s house in West Beirut while [‘spin doctoring’] tactics were being worked 
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out.”24 Later, during the 1990s, Hizbollah utilized its media apparatus to wage 
successful campaigns against both the IDF and South Lebanese Army (SLA) when 
they adopted a two-pronged military strategy, combining guerrilla and psychological 
warfare. According to Schliefer, “Hizbollah’s unique contribution to PSYOP lay in 
the way it combined conventional and psychological warfare, creating a whole new 
PSYOP idiom.”25 Al Manar was at the center of this campaign from its inception.  
 Al Manar has, since its foundation, been a television station devoted to the goals 
of Hizbollah, and although these have been subject to change over time, the 
overarching theme of resistance has persisted throughout. From its establishment in 
1991 to the Israeli withdrawal from the south in 2000, the bulk of the station’s 
programming was aimed at sustaining and, if possible, strengthening the Lebanese 
public’s support for Hizbollah’s campaign of resistance again the IDF in south 
Lebanon, while at the same time pressuring Israeli viewers to push their government 
for a unilateral withdrawal.  
 The eventual withdrawal was celebrated live on air for days, but this “triumph” 
came tinged with distress: what was to be the station’s purpose without the “hook” the 
resistance provided? The answer presented itself in the form of the outbreak of the so-
called al-Aqsa Intifada. Al Manar became “the secret weapon of the Palestinian 
intifada against Israeli occupation, the loyal supporter of armed resistance, devoting at 
least half its 24-hour-a-day satellite broadcasting to the battle between Palestinians 
and Israelis in the West Bank and Gaza.”26 The nature of some of this programming 
eventually resulted in the widespread banning of the station, however.  
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Banning Al Manar’s Satellite Transmissions 
 The campaign to have al Manar banned from transmitting via satellite began 
with an opinion piece that appeared in the Los Angeles Times in October 2002. The 
article, penned by Avi Jorisch,27 accused American companies who advertised on the 
station of promoting terrorism.
 
PepsiCo, Proctor and Gamble, Western Union, and a 
number of other major U.S. and European companies were named as advertisers on al 
Manar’s local broadcasts (the satellite broadcast was, at that time, commercial-free).28 
Jorisch followed up with a letter to the U.S. Congress asking its members to put 
pressure on these companies.
 
The majority of U.S. advertisers duly pulled out, and 
pressure to ban the transmission of the station itself increased. The Coalition Against 
Terrorist Media (CATM), an offshoot of the U.S.-based neo-Conservative 
organization Foundation for Defence of Democracy (FDD), was also founded at this 
time in order to generate further momentum for a ban. Representatives of FDD and 
CATM—including Jorisch, who came on board as the latter’s Executive Director—
have issued numerous statements claiming “al Manar runs graphic videos encouraging 
viewers, even children, to become suicide bombers and calls for acts of terrorism 
against civilians . . . Al Manar is an operational weapon in the hands of one of the 
world’s most dangerous terrorist organizations.”29  
 Al Manar was, at the same time, coming under pressure in Europe. While claims 
about incitement to suicide bombing are contested, this is not to deny that some 
measure of al Manar’s programming is objectionable by Western standards. The 
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French move against al Manar began after the station caused an uproar in October 
2002 by broadcasting a Syrian-produced drama series entitled al Shattat (“The 
Diaspora”), which is based on the controversial text known as the Protocols of the 
Elders of Zion, a 19th-century publication that depicts a Zionist conspiracy to take 
over the world.30 Scenes from the multipart miniseries include a dramatization of a 
rabbi slaying a young boy in order to use his blood to make Passover matzoh.31 
Another episode includes a scene depicting a secret Jewish government allegedly 
plotting to drop an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan.  
 The transmission of this series caused uproar in France, where incitement to racial 
hatred and anti-Semitism are criminal offences, and led France’s higher audiovisual 
authority to instruct al Manar to change the tone of its programming or face a ban. 
However, when in December 2004 a guest on a live show said that Zionists were 
deliberately trying to spread diseases, including AIDS, to Arabs, the authority decided 
to take the station to court. On 6 January 2005, France’s highest administrative court, 
the Conseil d'État (Council of State)—which had jurisdiction over the channel 
because it broadcast via a satellite based in France—decided that the programs al 
Manar broadcast “were in a militant context, with anti-Semitic connotations” and 
banned transmission of the station, warning the satellite provider Eutelsat that if it 
failed to stop broadcasting al Manar on its satellite within 48 hours of the decision it 
would be subject to a large fine.32 For its part, the station said it was unfair to ban a 
channel on the basis of one live caller, and it denies it is anti-Semitic.33 In the event, al 
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Manar voluntarily stopped broadcasting several days before the ban was to take 
effect, a move that prevented other stations on the same satellite network from being 
removed from the airwaves as well.34  
 As regards the U.S. ban, it followed shortly thereafter. In December 2004, al 
Manar was placed on an “exclusion list” by the U.S. State Department. This was 
followed up in March 2006 with al Manar’s designation as a terrorist organization by 
the U.S. Department of the Treasury.35 As a result, no one associated with the 
broadcaster is allowed entry to the U.S. and any U.S. company found to be doing 
business with al Manar will be subject to sanctions and possible prosecution.  The 
result is al Manar is effectively prohibited from transmitting in the United States. 
Although they result in the same outcomes, it’s worth noting that the French and U.S. 
bans rest on different legal foundations, with the French ban focusing on 
constitutional issues of expression, and the U.S. ban based on laws prohibiting the 
material support of terrorist organizations, which, according to Yadav, means that “At 
least in theory, then, the U.S. is suggesting that their own struggle against al Manar is 
not based on the substance of what it says, but rather on what it does.”36 In addition to 
being unavailable in North America, and with access being restricted in Europe, al 
Manar is also no longer available for satellite viewing in South America, nor in 
Australia or much of Africa; however, it is still broadcast throughout the Middle East, 
parts of Europe, and North Africa by Nilesat, whose major shareholder is the 
government of Egypt, and Arabsat, which is owned in part by the government of 
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Saudi Arabia. In any event, the station has all but entirely circumvented the satellite 
bans by providing free continuous live streaming online.  
 The above notwithstanding, al Manar officials were some of the most vociferous 
critics of the bans imposed on the broadcast of their satellite signals. The station 
responded in a statement that the U.S. action amounted to “intellectual terrorism” and 
an attack on press freedom.37 The Lebanese Minister of Information declared the ban 
proof of censorship of any opposition to Israel, and students demonstrated in support 
of al Manar.
 
In response to the French ban, the Lebanese Foreign Minister Mahmud 
Hammud commented “we consider this to be against the freedom of expression that 
the entire world, including the EU demands. We believe this attitude is not in 
harmony with the call for freedom of expression these countries advocate, and we 
believe there is a contradiction.”38 The banning was also criticized by organizations 
ranging from Hamas39 and Palestinian Islamic Jihad40 to Reporters Without Borders, 
with the latter warning against confusing anti-Israeli positions with anti-Semitism.41  
 
Al Manar’s Role in the Summer 2006 Crisis  
 In the summer of 2006, events in Lebanon put Hizbollah and al Manar back in the 
spotlight. During the crisis precipitated by a cross-border raid made by Hizbollah, al 
Manar reverted to its original role as mouthpiece of the Lebanese ‘resistance.’ 
Although this time around the Israelis, cognizant of the role played by al Manar in the 
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previous conflict between the two sides, quickly sought to neutralize the station, they 
had little success.  
 Following Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, and believing itself 
relatively safe from the threat of Israeli aerial bombardment, al Manar invested in 
high-specification antennas, which allowed it to extend its broadcasts farther into 
Israel. As a result, residents of Haifa, Israel’s third largest city—which is located 
some 30 miles from the Lebanese border—are now in range of al Manar’s 
transmissions. Al Manar’s headquarters in Haret Hreik and the above-mentioned 
antennas—one of which was located near Baalbek, northeast of Beirut, and another in 
Maroun al-Ras in southern Lebanon42—were some of the first targets of IDF air 
attacks when hostilities erupted between Israel and Hizbollah in early July 2006. Al 
Manar’s Beirut headquarters was first struck by the Israeli Air Force on Thursday, 
July 13, the second day of the crisis. The complex was bombed again on July 16, 
resulting in a fire in the station and surrounding buildings. Although the station’s 
broadcasts continued uninterrupted during the first attack—which severely damaged 
the upper stories of the building—the second attack caused the station’s signal to be 
briefly unavailable on several occasions before returning to full strength.43 Also, on 
the second day of the crisis, the first-ever Hizbollah rocket attacks on Haifa 
commenced.  
 Indeed the IDF—in addition to conventional attacks on media targets in 
Lebanon—is also said to have broadened its psyop activities over the course of the 
crisis. The first reports of intercepts of al Manar’s satellite transmissions were carried 
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by Egypt’s Middle East News Agency, which said that on Sunday, July 23, Israel 
managed “to intercept the satellite transmissions of Hizbollah’s al Manar TV channel 
for the third successive day, replacing them with Israeli transmissions that reportedly 
showed Hizbollah command sites and rocket launching pads which Israel claimed it 
has raided.”44 A little over a week later, al Jazeera reported that a series of still photos 
with captions appeared on the screens of al Manar viewers for several minutes during 
the evening news. Al Jazeera attributed the interruption to “Israeli-backed hackers.” 
One of the images showed the corpse of a khaki-clad man lying face-down with 
accompanying Arabic text reading: “This is the photograph of a body of a member of 
Hizbollah’s special forces. Nasrallah lies: it is not we who are hiding our losses.” The 
al Jazeera report is also accompanied by what appears to be a screen shot that shows a 
photograph of Nasrollah accompanied by the text “member of Hizbollah: watch out,” 
which al Jazeera said also appeared on TV screens.45  
 The Israeli bombing of Hizbollah’s media outlets received harsh criticism from 
journalistic and human rights organizations. The Committee to Protect Journalists, the 
International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), Human Rights Watch, and others agreed 
that the attacks were a violation of international law, as the station’s broadcasts were 
not serving any direct military function (e.g., sending military communiqués).46 Aidan 
White, the IFJ’s General Secretary, said: “The bombing of al Manar is a clear 
demonstration that Israel has a policy of using violence to silence media it does not 
agree with. This action means media can become routine targets in every conflict. It is 
a strategy that spells catastrophe for press freedom and should never be endorsed by a 
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government that calls itself democratic.”47 Human Rights Watch agreed, insisting 
“that Lebanese civilian opinion might influence how the Lebanese government 
responds to Hizbollah is not a sufficiently direct contribution to military action to 
render the media used to influence that opinion a legitimate military target. Rather, 
broadcasts should be met with competing broadcasts, propaganda with propaganda.”48  
   
New Media Strategy 2: Islamists and the Internet 
 Islamic texts and discussion venues have been accessible online for about 
twenty-five years. Anderson discerns three phases in the growth of an Islamic 
presence on the Internet characterised by the predominance of three different groups:  
1. “Technological adepts”: People who uploaded scanned texts and added a 
generally laic discourse 
2. “Activists and official voices”: Individuals at two ends of the ideological 
spectrum, competing for adherents 
3. “Spokespersons and audiences”: People representing the “online advent of 
moderate Islam.”49 
 The assertion here is that a fourth phase developed post-9/11 spearheaded by 
radical Islamic fundamentalists, particularly those supportive of Osama bin Laden and 
al Qaeda. Throughout the maturation process identified by Anderson, the principal 
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actors in each phase employed and, in many cases even furthered the development of, 
the best publicly available technology.50 The representatives of phase four were no 
different.   
 In his discussion of Islam and the Internet, Anderson champions the role of the 
Net in the emergence of an “activist but distinctly moderate Islam, for which the 
Internet seems peculiarly congenial.”51 This is in keeping with much early work on 
the positive effects of new ICTs for global civil—read ‘positive’—society actors. The 
spread of information does not necessarily encourage increased civility or, indeed, 
stability, however. On the contrary, “Johannes Guttenberg’s invention of movable 
type in the mid-fifteenth century led not only to the Reformation but to the wars of 
religion that followed it, as the sudden proliferation of texts spurred doctrinal 
controversies and awakened long dormant grievances.”52 Such impacts are not 
restricted to Christianity; historically, the salience of technology in precipitating 
change within Islam has been vast. According to Mandaville, it was the experience of 
European colonialism and the concomitant perceived decline in Islamic civilisation 
that paved the way for the embrace of print technology within the Muslim world in 
the nineteenth century. “The book, pamphlet, and newsletter were taken up with 
urgency in order to counter the threat which Europe was posing to the Muslim 
umma.”53 In theory at least, this resulted in Islam’s scared texts being made available 
for the first time to anyone who could read them, to “be consulted by any Ahmad, 
Mahmud, or Muhammad, who could make what he [would] of them.”54 In a similar 
fashion, just as “the move to print technology meant not only a new method for 
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transmitting texts, but also a new idiom of selecting, writing and presenting works to 
cater for a new kind of reader,”55 the advent of the Internet has resulted in not only a 
new method for transmitting text, audio, and video, but also a new idiom of selecting, 
producing, and arranging data to cater for a new kind of audience.  
 In a videotaped statement that was released in December 2001 in which he 
comments upon the 9/11 attackers, Osama bin Laden stated:  
“[T]hose youths who conducted the operations did not accept any fiqh in 
the popular terms, but they accepted the fiqh56 that the Prophet 
Muhammad brought. Those young men…said in deeds, in New York 
and Washington, speeches that overshadowed all other speeches made 
everywhere in the world. The speeches are understood by both Arabs 
and non-Arabs—even by the Chinese.”57  
Bin Laden thus describes the events of 9/11 not as primarily hostile or vengeful 
actions, which they undoubtedly were, but underlines instead their essentially 
communicative aspect(s).58 The centrality of communication(s) and communication 
technologies, especially the Internet, to al Qaeda and its affiliates was not 
immediately clear to researchers, analysts, or policy makers, however. Michael 
Scheuer admits in the introduction to Imperial Hubris (2004) that a major problem 
with his previous book, Through Our Enemies Eyes (2003), was that in it he seriously 
underestimated the role of the Internet in al Qaeda’s activities.59 Of course, one reason 
for this may be the rapidly evolving nature of al Qaeda’s Internet use and thus also its 
impact. 
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 Clearly interesting things can happen when a “complex world discourse” such as 
Islam comes into contact with a force that can claim an equally wide geographic 
spread: the socially and politically transformative effects of the Internet. Islam and 
political Islam in particular has exhibited a wide range of responses to this relatively 
new information and communication technology with certain features being eagerly 
appropriated and others vociferously rejected.60 Bin Laden himself has observed that 
“In the past there was imperfection, but it was partial. Today, however, the 
imperfection touches the entire public because of the communications revolution and 
because the media enter every home.”61 However, citing the Western media’s 
“vicious campaign” against Islam, Bin Laden, in a 2002 Internet posting, called on 
Muslim publishers and broadcasters to take “[their] rightful position and play [their] 
required role in confronting…[the West’s] visual, audio, and written organs.”62   
 
Al Qaeda’s Internet Use 
 Al Qaeda’s Internet presence increased from January 2002 when the group 
began to employ two sites, in particular, to spread their message. Al Qaeda never 
claimed ownership of the sites, Al-Neda and Al-Ansar, but senior al Qaeda 
commander Abu-al-Layth al-Libi provided the following recommendation as regards 
the al-Neda site—also known as the ‘Center for Islamic Studies and Research’—to 
visitors to Islamic Jihad Online: 
It is a website run by reliable brothers …and financed by brothers that 
you know. It is a good website and we hope that God will accept its 
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actions…[W]e will not spare any effort or withhold anything we can 
offer to this website.”63  
Al-Neda and Al-Ansar published, amongst other things: 
- Audio and video clips of Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda spokesman Sualaiman 
Abu Ghaith, and others. 
- Bi-weekly electronic journals containing analyses of the conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
- Islamic scholars’ and clerics’ evaluations and explanations of al Qaeda’s past 
attacks, future plans, and admonishments to others to act. These included a 
series of articles claiming that suicide bombings aimed at Americans are 
justifiable under Islamic law 
- Essays describing al Qaeda’s war aims and assessments of how achieving 
these goals would  benefit the Muslim umma.64 
There was also media speculation that the al-Neda site was being used to direct al 
Qaeda operational cells. According to one report the site has carried low-level 
operational information: for example, in February 2002 it was said to have published 
the names and home phone numbers of al Qaeda fighters captured by Pakistan 
following their escape from fighting in Afghanistan with the aim that sympathisers 
would contact their families and let them know they were alive.65 Click on 
Alneda.com today and the following appears: Hacked, Tracked, and NOW Owned by 
the USA. The site is described as “a mostly unmoderated discussion board relating to 
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current world affairs surrounding Islamic Jihad [sic] and the US led war on terrorism 
(plus other conflicts around the globe).” 
 Michael Scheuer has argued that since 9/11 bin Laden has maintained a 
deliberately low profile for two reasons: firstly, to avoid the US and her allies fixing 
his position and, secondly, because he knows his continued silence induces fear 
amongst Western publics. The latter notwithstanding, however, Internet sites 
maintained by al Qaeda and its supporters provide not just bin Laden’s followers, but 
also those he is seeking to incite to holy war, with a regular, easily accessible flow of 
information and comment carrying al Qaeda’s imprimatur.”66 Discussing the impact 
of these websites, Paul Eedle goes further asserting: “As a result of the al Qaeda 
viewpoint, it now takes great courage to speak out against the jihadi view….[and] 
public debate in the Muslim world is now very radical.”67  
 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and al Qaeda in Iraq’s Cyber Strategy  
 The whole al Qaeda movement has used the Internet since 9/11 to pursue its 
goal of destroying American power in the world, but Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was 
perhaps the most melodramatic and successful player. The world first heard of 
Zarqawi on 5 February, 2003, the day that then US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, 
appeared at the UN making the case for the invasion of Iraq. In his statement Powell 
told the Security Council that “Iraq today harbours a deadly terrorist network, headed 
by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, an associate and collaborator of Osama bin Laden and his 
al Qaeda lieutenants.”68 Throughout the remainder of 2003, Zarqawi’s name only 
arose again as a result of leaks from American and Jordanian intelligence to media 
outlets. However, in a little over four weeks in April and May 2004, “he rocketed to 
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worldwide fame, or infamy, by a deliberate combination of extreme violence and 
Internet publicity.”69  
 In early April 2004, Zarqawi posted online a thirty minute audio recording which 
explained who he was, why he was fighting, and details of the attacks for which he 
and his group were responsible. Paul Eedle has described the latter as “a 
comprehensive branding statement”: 
The Internet gave Zarqawi the means to build a brand very quickly. 
Suddenly the mystery man had a voice, if not a face, and a clear 
ideology which explained his violence… But what is the point of an 
insurgent group building a brand, establishing a public profile in this 
way? The answer is to magnify the impact of its violence.70  
 Another of the functions of this original audio statement was to alert 
audiences that Zarqawi viewed the world rather differently than Osama bin 
Laden. Within the context of the Iraq conflict, Zarqawi was anxious to stress 
that the enemy was not just American troops, but also the Kurds and the Shi’ite 
Muslims. According to Zarqawi, the former are in league with the Israelis and 
the latter are not true Muslims.71 
 Amongst the claims of responsibility were the attack on the UN’s Baghdad 
headquarters, the shrine in Najaf, the Red Cross headquarters, and an assortment of 
attacks against Iraqi police stations (carried out in 2003). It was difficult to 
conclusively link these and other attacks prior to Zarqawi’s admission of 
responsibility, nor was it entirely clear what precise message should be taken from the 
                                                 
69
 Paul Eedle, “Al Qaeda’s Super-Weapon: The Internet,” paper presented at conference entitled Al-
Qaeda 2.0, New America Foundation, Washington DC, 1-2 December 2004. The full text of the paper 
is available online at 
http://www.outtherenews.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=89&topic=7 
70
 Ibid. 
71
 Ibid. 
 22 
attacks, which were open to differing interpretations. It is also worth noting that prior 
to the initiation of his Internet-based PR campaign, each of Zarqawi’s attacks had to 
kill large numbers of people in order to get noticed in the chaos and mounting daily 
death toll in Iraq. By going online, however, Zarqawi was able to both control the 
interpretation of his violent message and achieve greater impact with smaller 
operations. By the end of April 2004, his group were issuing communiqués via the al-
Ansar website. The first claimed responsibility for a suicide speedboat attack on 
Iraq’s offshore oil export terminal in the Gulf, which, although the operation failed, 
still shook oil markets because of Zarqawi’s efforts at publicizing the attack through 
the Internet.  
 In May 2004 Zarqawi took things a step farther when he used the Internet’s force 
multiplying effect to the maximum effect for the first time when 
…he personally cut off the head of an American hostage live on video, and 
had the footage posted on the Internet….The entire purpose of the 
beheading was to video it, to create images that would grip the imaginations 
of friends and enemies alike. It worked. Zarqawi risked almost nothing in 
this operation; but he started a withdrawal of foreign contractors which has 
paralysed reconstruction in Iraq and done as much if not more to undermine 
US plans as a bomb that killed 100 people in Najaf. And he made himself a 
hero to jihadis across the world.72  
No other figure has yet emerged from within the ranks of al-Qaeda-affiliated groups 
to fill the cyber-gap left by Zarqawi’s death in June 2006.  But the emergence of such 
a figure is not crucial to the continued buoyancy of al-Qaeda’s online presence. 
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Other Voices 
 Official and semi-official websites are not the only important jihadi cyber 
spaces. An increasing number of Islamist groups and individuals (re-)post articles and 
analyses, exchange information, voice opinions, and debate ideas on websites and 
forums that they themselves have established. Writing in The National Interest, David 
Martin Jones observed: “The ummah is no longer a geographical concept; the ‘virtual’ 
world of the potential cybercaliphate knows no conventional boundaries.”73 Today’s 
Internet “allows militant Muslims from every country to meet, talk, and get to know 
each other electronically, a familiarisation and bonding process that in the 1980s and 
early 1990s required a trip to Sudan, Yemen, Afghanistan, or Pakistan.”74 A majority 
of the postings to these websites are explicitly pro-bin Laden, praising him as a hero 
and applauding al Qaeda’s attacks. The proliferation of these sites acts as free 
publicity for al Qaeda’s cause, but the more important impact of this development 
may be the number of Muslim groups and individuals who become aware of jihad-
related activities and the religious justifications for them via these sites. For example, 
mainstream Muslim religious leaders such as Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi, whose website 
is one of the top three visited Arabic language websites in the world, support attacks 
even on some Western civilians in Iraq on the grounds that they are all part of an 
illegal occupation of an Islamic-majority country.75 
 New web sites appear—and also disappear—frequently, popular chat rooms are 
said to have lists of applicants awaiting admission, and most sites evidence technical 
savvy on the part of their producers, almost all including audio, video, and the like. 
Together these contributions add up to a tremendous input into what bin Laden has 
repeatedly said is his and al Qaeda’s top priority: the instigation to violent jihad of as 
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many Muslims in as many locales worldwide as possible. Al Qaeda does not provide 
financing, have any management role, or provide dedicated content for most of these 
sites; nonetheless they act as an invaluable force-multiplier for its cyber-based 
incitement strategy.  
 Recognising this benefit, al Qaeda has assured its “Internet brothers” that “the 
media war with the oppressive crusader enemy takes a common effort and can use a 
lot of ideas. We are prepared to help out with these ideas.”76 Interestingly also while 
most Islamic extremist sites are in Arabic, Urdu, and Indonesian languages, there are 
an increasing number available in English, French, German, and Dutch. This signifies 
both the rise of Islamism in the West and growing efforts by extremist Islamic voices 
to reach Western Muslim populations online.77  
 As regards US government attacks on al Qaeda websites: these may make security 
sense, but also serve to validate Bin Laden’s and al-Zawahiri’s claims of hypocrisy by 
showing that freedom of speech is only to be extended to America’s friends and allies. 
For example, a statement appearing on the al-Neda site in 2002 read:   
Every time you [the United States] close a site, you only further 
expose yourself to the world and the truth about the democracy you 
brag about. It is a democracy that is tailored to your measurements 
only. And when people oppose you, your democracy turns into the 
ugliest forms of domination, tyranny, and despotism on earth.78  
In addition, Scheuer suggests that the United States and its allies have increased the 
appeal and presumed importance of the al Qaeda sites by subjecting them to repeated 
cyber attacks, which have taken them offline and forced their owners to hunt for new 
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host servers. The UK-based Arabic daily Al-Hayat reported that Al-Neda was the 
target of some twenty U.S. attacks. While such targeting undoubtedly made the sites 
more difficult for interested readers to locate, they are doubtless interpreted by 
Islamists on the other hand as evidence of American fear of al Qaeda’s ‘voice’ and 
validation for bin Laden’s claim that freedom of speech is not to be extended to 
Muslims, while also potentially resulting in a readership boost.79 
 
Conclusion 
 Almost from the outset bin Laden and his associates “thought big” by 
integrating local causes and conflicts into a global campaign shaped “to resonate with 
Muslims of all stripes and cultures.” Bin Laden has made globalization work for him; 
he has a capacity for what business executives term ‘strategic control,’ that is tailoring 
himself, his ‘workforce,’ and his ‘product(s)’ to the changing ‘marketplace,’ while at 
the same time making the most of the best available technologies.80 The seriousness 
of the implications of such a strategy was remarked upon by a number of 
commentators prior to being taken up by Rumsfeld. In an article that appeared in 
Foreign Policy in 2004, Jason Burke offered the following admonition: 
Bin Laden is a propagandist, directing his efforts at attracting those 
Muslims who have hitherto shunned his extremist message. He knows 
that only through mass participation in his project will he have any 
chance of success. His worldview is receiving immeasurably more 
support around the globe than it was two years ago, let alone 15 years 
ago when he began serious campaigning. The objective of Western 
countries is to eliminate the threat of terror, or at least to manage it in a 
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way that does not seriously impinge on the daily lives of its citizens. Bin 
Laden’s aim is to radicalize and mobilize. He is closer to achieving his 
goals than the West is to deterring him.81  
One of the most significant aspects of al Qaeda’s post-9/11 reshaping has been the 
significant increase in its reliance on the Internet as a soft power tool.82 Bin Laden’s 
cadres had employed the Internet for communication and propaganda purposes prior 
to the US attacks,83 but their use of the Internet increased exponentially thereafter. 
Michael Scheuer has put this down to the loss of al Qaeda’s Afghan base and the 
consequent dispersal of fighters, along with rapid development of the medium itself 
and the computers and other gadgets with which it can increasingly be accessed, and 
the proliferation of Internet cafes globally.84 Indeed al Qaeda’s increased virtuality 
after 9/11 inspired one analyst to coin the descriptor “al Qaeda 2.0”85 and another to 
liken al Qaeda’s deployment of cyber-based tools to their own “stealth ‘revolution in 
military affairs’.”86  
 On the other hand, while Hizbollah was an early adopter of Internet technology,87 
up until quite recently this was secondary in terms of the group’s new media strategy 
to its satellite television-based information campaign with some estimates putting al 
Manar’s local and satellite audience in 2003-2004 at a combined 10 million viewers 
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worldwide.88 This all changed with the widespread banning of the station’s satellite 
transmissions in 2006. On a practical level, if the goal of the French, US, and other 
bans on al Manar’s satellite transmission was to make the station unavailable to large 
numbers of people worldwide, it translated into an own-goal when, almost 
immediately on the announcement of these, the station commenced live online 
streaming. Eventually, this may mean that the station will draw more viewers via its 
freely available Internet service than via more costly satellite connections. The U.S. 
ban was likely doubly ill-advised because by blocking al Manar’s transmission, 
Washington not only increased the station’s notoriety and thus popularity, but also 
ignored political logic that upholds interests. Unfortunately for the U.S. and its 
interest in reaching out to the “Arab street,” the chairman of Hizbollah’s executive 
committee, Hashim Safiy-al-Din, summed up the feelings of presumably a great many 
people in the Middle East when he said about the ban: 
 [T]his impudent attack against our rights, with all their media, political, 
cultural and economic dimensions, is not a sign of strength but a sign of the 
U.S. weakness and powerlessness. By doing this it has proved its tyranny and 
oppression, which we have been talking about…[T]he U.S.A. is talking about 
democracy and freedom of speech, but at the same time it cannot tolerate a 
sound or an image despite all the media it has available throughout the 
world.89 
 If, as Burke suggests, bin Laden is closer to achieving his goals than the West is 
to deterring him, the same is almost certainly true for Hizbollah. Recent events, much 
of them played out live on al Manar, have ensured that Hizbollah and its leader 
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Nasrollah have gained considerably in stature right across the Middle East. It is no 
surprise then when, in the context of the Lebanese crisis, George Bush and 
Condoleezza Rice called for the birth of a ‘new Middle East,’ that many in the Arab 
world felt that just such a birthing was already in the offing but, as one opinion writer 
put it, “it will not be exactly the baby [the U.S.] has longed for. For one thing, it will 
be neither secular nor friendly to the United States. For another, it is going to be a 
rough birth.”90 There are myriad complex reasons for this, but at least one relates to 
the increased availability of new media technologies and their powerful effects, and 
the first-hand knowledge available to at least two powerful actors in the Middle East 
drama that in the information age “the ability to take command and control of the 
global info-sphere is every bit as important as any other weapon on the military, 
intelligence, financial or any other fronts.”91  
 
                                                 
90
 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “The ‘New Middle East’ Bush is Resisting,” The Washington Post, 23 August 
2006, A15. Available online at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/08/22/AR2006082200978.html.  
91
 Philip Taylor, “Desert Storm Blowback: Psychological Operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
2003,” in Lars Nicander & Magnus Ranstorp (Ed.s), Terrorism in the Information Age: New Frontiers? 
(Stockholm: National Defence College, 2004), 108. 
 
